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In recent years the interest in multivariate and higher-order risk preferences has 
increased noticeably. A growing body of literature has demonstrated both the relevance 
and the impact of these preferences in several domains, although for health the 
empirical evidence is lacking. In this study we empirically measure multivariate and 
higher-order risk preferences for quality of life and longevity, the two elements of the 
Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) model. We observe overwhelming support for 
correlation seeking between these two attributes as well as significant evidence of 
cross-imprudence and cross-intemperance. These findings indicate that higher-order 
risk preferences appear to deviate more from neutrality for health than for money. 
Furthermore, we test if preferences for a risky treatment for a disease affecting only 
quality of life, depend on life expectancy. Our results show no systematic evidence of 
such a relation, although there is a marginally significant positive relation between 
riskiness of the comorbidity affecting life expectancy and risk aversion for a treatment 
affecting quality of life. We therefore observe no definitive deviation from the QALY 
model, although the model appears to be more robust when expected longevity is high. 
 
JEL Classification: I10 





Health and health care are surrounded by a lot of risk, implying that risk aversion plays 
a central role in health economics. Recently, several studies have convincingly shown 
that also some concepts beyond risk aversion, such as prudence (i.e. a positive sign of 
the third derivative), are much more important than previously thought (e.g. Eeckhoudt 
and Schlesinger, 2006). These concepts are coined higher-order risk attitudes. Hence, the 
necessity to look beyond second-order risk attitudes has become clear, also in the 
health care field. This knowledge is important for several reasons. First, it allows to test 
if the quality-adjusted life year (QALY) model represents individual health preferences, 
and hence if QALYs are a proper metric to value health improvements. Second, higher-
order risk preferences are relevant to many everyday health care decisions, such as 
risky treatment choices to combat a disease in the face of comorbidities. It is well 
known that many people suffer from two or more diseases at the same time 
(MacMahon, 2018), which may influence their preferences for treating their primary 
disease. 
 Courbage and Rey (2006) pointed out that the level of prudence is a main 
determinant of the optimal level of prevention for health risks, and Pauker (2014) 
advocated higher-order risk attitudes as a research topic that should receive priority on 
the research agenda in the domain of medical decision making. Moreover, Bleichrodt et 
al. (2003a) have shown the importance of higher-order risk attitudes in treatment 
decisions in the presence of comorbidities influencing life expectancy. They 
demonstrated that economic evaluations and medical decision analyses that ignore 
comorbidities will lead to recommendations that are biased in the direction of too much 
treatment if aversion to health status risks increases with life expectancy. They also 
derived several predictions regarding treatment decisions under particular 
assumptions, but so far these predictions had not yet been tested empirically. In 
addition, Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) showed how investment in tertiary preventive care 
(i.e., the treatment of an established or chronic disease in order to minimize the 
negative health consequences of the disease) depends on cross-prudence of health and 
income, i.e. it depends on whether an individual has a positive third cross-derivative of 
income with respect to health. 
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 Krieger and Mayrhofer (2012) have explored higher-order risk attitudes in a health 
context empirically and observed both risk aversion and prudence. However, they only 
studied univariate risk attitudes and no multivariate risk attitudes, whereas in many 
settings a decision maker actually faces more than one attribute (Keeney and Raiffa, 
1993). Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) and Ebert and van de Kuilen (2015) have stressed the 
importance of multi-attribute decision making, given the high prevalence of decisions 
where more than one attribute is involved. In the health domain, for instance, the 
widely used QALY model, which is the recommended metric to be used in health 
economic evaluations (Sanders et al., 2016), involves the attributes longevity and 
quality of life (QoL). 
 In case of two attributes, correlation aversion means that an individual prefers a 50% 
chance of a loss in one attribute and a 50% chance of a loss in the other attribute over a 
50-50 gamble offering a loss in neither attribute or a loss in both (Eeckhoudt et al., 
2007). An example of correlation aversion in health is when a patient prefers a lottery 
where he will get either a lower quality of life (50% chance) or a shorter life expectancy 
(50% chance) over a lottery where he has a 50% chance to get both a health 
deterioration and a lower life expectancy at the same time, and 50% chance to get no 
health losses at all. Bleichrodt et al. (2003a) showed that various consequences of the 
QALY model can be tested by obtaining knowledge about higher-order (cross-) 
derivatives of the utility function for longevity and QoL. One of their predictions was 
that people are risk averse for both longevity and quality of life, and correlation seeking 
for the combination of these two attributes. That is, people would prefer to combine a 
bad [good] health state with a short [long] life duration over mixing these two.1 The risk 
apportionment technique allows us to test these predictions. 
 Bleichrodt et al. (2003a) also showed that, according to the QALY model, risk 
aversion for QoL should not depend on having a comorbidity that only affects longevity. 
In addition, they predicted that decreases in the riskiness of longevity caused by this 
comorbidity will generally lead to more treatment-prone behaviour (i.e. people get less 
risk averse for QoL). Finally, Bleichrodt et al. (2003a) derived how risk aversion, and 
 
1 This prediction was based on empirical evidence by McNeil et al. (1981) that people were not willing to 
trade off time to gain health for short life durations, and by Sutherland et al. (1982) that extension of lifetime beyond a certain threshold (‘maximal endurable time’) is valued negatively for poor health states. 
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hence treatment intensity, depend on higher-order multivariate risk preferences (i.e. 
risk aversion, correlation aversion, cross-prudence, and cross-temperance).  
 Attema et al. (2019) recently applied the risk apportionment technique to the health 
field, when they measured multivariate risk preferences, up to the fourth order, for 
longevity and wealth. They reported substantial risk aversion and correlation aversion 
for gains, but the opposite was found for losses. Furthermore, they observed less 
substantial amounts of prudence and temperance, but still significantly more than 50%. 
However, that study only investigated the duration component of the QALY model and 
hence could not test all the propositions from Bleichrodt et al. (2003a). 
 In this paper we are the first to empirically study several higher-order properties of 
the QALY model. This design enables us to test the theoretical predictions put forward 
by Bleichrodt et al. (2003a). In a nutshell, we combine an implementation of the risk 
apportionment technique with a treatment intensity task, in which we measure risk 
aversion for QoL for different life durations. First, we obtain evidence on individuals’ 
correlation attitude between longevity and QoL. Second, we elicit their third- and 
fourth-order multivariate risk attitudes, i.e. cross-prudence and cross-temperance. 
Finally, we measure preferred treatment intensity for treating a disease affecting only 
QoL for patients also suffering from a comorbidity which affects longevity. Here, a 
higher treatment intensity increases the spread in the potential QoL outcomes. The 
latter measure enables us to test several theoretical predictions based on the QALY 
model as suggested by Bleichrodt et al. (2003a). 
 Our results show that subjects have marked risk preferences for longevity and QoL. 
First, we find a lot of risk aversion for both attributes, confirming most theoretical models. Second, we confirm Bleichrodt et al.’s (2003a) prediction of correlation seeking, 
with an overwhelming majority of subjects showing this preference. Furthermore, in 
contrast to most studies using monetary outcomes, we also find highly significant 
evidence for cross-imprudence and cross-intemperance. However, we observe no 
systematic correlation between treatment intensity and duration. Finally, we observe a 
marginally significant relation between treatment intensity and riskiness of life 






We assume preferences ≽ satisfy a weak-order, i.e. they are complete and transitive. 
Individuals care about QoL (q) and longevity (t). According to the QALY model, 
preferences for chronic health states are evaluated by: 
 𝑈(𝑞, 𝑡) = 𝑉(𝑞) × 𝑊(𝑡). (1) 
 
If expected utility holds, a subject is risk averse for QoL if 𝑈𝑞𝑞 ≤ 0 and risk averse for 
longevity if 𝑈𝑡𝑡 ≤ 0. Prudence for QoL holds if 𝑈𝑞𝑞𝑞 ≥ 0, prudence for longevity implies 𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0 and temperance holds if 𝑈𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞 ≤ 0 for QoL and 𝑈𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ≤ 0 for longevity. 
Concerning multivariate risk preferences, a subject is correlation averse if 𝑈𝑞𝑡 ≤ 0, 
cross-prudent for longevity if 𝑈𝑞𝑞𝑡 ≥ 0, cross-prudent for QoL if 𝑈𝑞𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0, and cross-
temperate if 𝑈𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡 ≤ 0. Opposite signs define correlation seeking, cross-imprudence and 
cross-intemperance, respectively. 
 Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) were the first to operationalize (higher-order) 
risk preferences in terms of choices between two binary lotteries with equally likely 
outcomes that distribute harm and benefits differently, as illustrated below. An example 
of an item revealing risk aversion for QoL is the following: 
 
What is your most preferred alternative? 
Option A Option B 
50%: Live with 40% of full health for 40 
years 
50%: Live with 50% of full health for 40 
years 
50%: Live with 30% of full health for 40 
years 
50%: Live with 60% of full health for 40 
years 
 
Here, the risk averse individual would choose Option A, because it offers the same 
expected QoL as Option B (i.e. 45%), but with a lower spread. In fact, Option B is a 
mean-preserving spread of Option A. the general idea of the risk apportionment method 
is to have these kinds of choices between two-outcome gambles, with one resulting 
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from the other from a mean-preserving spread. Similarly, risk aversion for longevity 
could be determined by gambles such as the following: 
 
 
What is your most preferred alternative? 
Option A Option B 
50%: Live with 60% of full health for 40 
years 
50%: Live with 60% of full health for 40 
years 
50%: Live with 60% of full health for 30 
years 
50%: Live with 60% of full health for 50 
years 
 
In this example, Option A is riskless and Option B involves a mean-preserving spread of 
the same longevity. The risk apportionment method also allows for eliciting higher-
order risk attitudes by adding different sources of uncertainty. For example, prudence 
for longevity can be elicited by the following choice: 
 
 
                                             What is your most preferred alternative? 
Option A Option B 
50%: Live with 60% of full health for 40 
years 
50%: Live with 60% of full health for 10 
OR 30 years 
50%: Live with 60% of full health for 30 
years OR 50 years 
50%: Live with 60% of full health for 20 
years 
 
In this case, QoL is always 60% and longevity is either 40 years or 20 years. The 
choice involves distributing a zero-mean longevity risk of ?̃? =±10 years to the bad 
longevity outcome (20 years, Option A) or the good longevity outcome (40 years, 
Option B). The former choice reflects imprudence and the latter choice reflects 
prudence. Similarly, temperance can be elicited by including two independent 
longevity or QoL risks and determining if the respondent prefers to aggregate 
(intemperance) or disaggregate (temperance) these risks. 
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Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) have demonstrated that the risk apportionment method can 
also be extended to elicit (higher-order) cross-risk attitudes when risk in both 
attributes is involved. For example, consider the following gamble: 
 
 
What is your most preferred alternative? 
Option A Option B 
50%: Live with 60% of full health for 40 
years 
50%: Live with 30% of full health for 20 
years 
50%: Live with 60% of full health for 20 
years 
50%: Live with 30% of full health for 40 
years 
 
This gamble involves risk in both QoL (30% or 60%) and longevity (20 or 40 years). 
The essential choice is if one prefers to combine the good outcome for QoL with the 
good outcome for longevity, while at the same time combining the bad outcomes for 
both (Option A), or if one prefers to spread the risks and combine the good outcome 
for the one attribute with the bad outcome for the other attribute (Option B). The 
former is deemed correlation seeking and the latter correlation aversion. 
Tests of cross-prudence and cross-temperance can be conducted in a similar fashion. 
The below question could for instance be used for cross-prudence for longevity. 
 
What is your most preferred alternative? 
Option A Option B 
50%: Live with 60% of full health for 30 
years 
50%: Live with 40% OR 80% of full health 
for 40 years 
50%: Live with 40% OR 80% of full health 
for 30 years 
50%: Live with 60% of full health for 40 
years 
 
 Looking closely, we can see that one lives either 30 or 40 more years in both gambles. 
Furthermore, QoL may be 60% or it may be another gamble, resulting in either 40% or 
80%. In effect, a zero-mean risk on QoL (?̃?~±20%) has to be apportioned to either the 
good outcome of the gamble (i.e. t=40 years, Option A) or the bad outcome of the 
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gamble (i.e. t=30 years, Option B). Someone who prefers to combine the zero-mean risk 
with the good longevity outcome is said to be cross-prudent for longevity, whilst 
someone who prefers combining the zero-mean risk with the bad longevity outcome is 
called cross-imprudent for longevity. Tests for cross-prudence for QoL and temperance 
can be done similarly. 
 Embedded in our study is the assumption that, generally, individuals prefer both 
higher levels of longevity and higher levels of QoL. While this method relies on the 
assumption that individuals aim to maximize their utility, it does not require 
assumptions about the functional form of the utility function (Attema et al., 2019). The 
risk apportionment technique can also be applied to elicit the other traits mentioned 
above.  
 In order to test the other predictions of Bleichrodt et al. (2003a), as described in the 
introduction, we elicit the sign of several (higher-order) risk traits. Table 1 gives an 
overview of all traits we elicited and the associated implications for the utility function 
in case of EU. 
 
Table 1. Overview of elicited traits and their implied EU condition. 
Trait if Prospect 1 is chosen Prospect 1 Prospect 2 EU condition 
Prospect 1 is 
chosen 
Risk aversion for QoL (𝑞 >𝑞2 > 𝑞1) (0.5, 𝑞 − 𝑞1; 𝑞 − 𝑞2) (0.5, 𝑞 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2; 𝑞) 𝑈𝑞𝑞 ≤ 0 
Risk aversion for longevity (t>𝑡2 > 𝑡1) (0.5, 𝑡 − 𝑡1; 𝑡 − 𝑡2) (0.5, 𝑡 − 𝑡1 − 𝑡2; 𝑡) 𝑈𝑡𝑡 ≤ 0 
Correlation aversion (𝑞 >𝑞1, 𝑡 > 𝑡1) (0.5, 𝑡 − 𝑡1, 𝑞 − 𝑞1; 𝑞, 𝑡) (0.5, 𝑡, 𝑞 − 𝑞1; 𝑞, 𝑡 − 𝑡1) 𝑈𝑞𝑡 ≤ 0 
Cross-prudence for QoL (𝑞 >𝑞1, 𝐸(?̃?) = 0) (0.5, 𝑡, 𝑞 − 𝑞1; 𝑞, 𝑡 + ?̃?) (0.5, 𝑡 + ?̃?, 𝑞 − 𝑞1; 𝑡, 𝑞) 𝑈𝑞𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0 
Cross-prudence for longevity 
(t> 𝑡1, 𝐸(?̃?) = 0) (0.5, 𝑡 − 𝑡1, 𝑞; 𝑞 + ?̃?, 𝑡) (0.5, 𝑡 − 𝑡1, 𝑞 + ?̃?; 𝑞, 𝑡) 𝑈𝑞𝑞𝑡 ≥ 0 
Cross-temperance (𝐸(?̃?) =0, 𝐸(?̃?) = 0) (0.5, 𝑡 + ?̃?, 𝑞; 𝑞 + ?̃?, 𝑡) (0.5, 𝑡 + ?̃?, 𝑞 + ?̃?; 𝑞, 𝑡) 𝑈𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡 ≤ 0 
 
 In Table 1, Prospect 1 of the first row (0.5, 𝑞 − 𝑞1; 𝑞 − 𝑞2) denotes a prospect where 
the subject has 50% probability to live with a QoL of 𝑞 − 𝑞1 for T years, and 50% to live 
in QoL of 𝑞 − 𝑞2 for T years. The other prospect of this first row is riskier, since it 
involves a lower minimum (𝑞 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2) and a higher maximum (q). The other 
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prospects can be interpreted similarly. For cross-prudence and cross-temperance, ?̃? and ?̃?, denote zero-mean risks on longevity and QoL, respectively. 
 In the model of Bleichrodt et al. (2003a), patients can choose the intensity n of a 
treatment combatting a disease. This only affects their QoL q and is risky, since it can either be effective, improving the patient’s health by b*n, or it can be detrimental due to side effects, in which case the patient’s health will deteriorate by c*n.2 Hence, the 
amount of upside and downside potential depends on the treatment intensity chosen by 
the patient; the higher the intensity, the more extreme the outcomes will be. In this 
study we test the predictions of Bleichrodt et al. (2003a) by asking subjects to choose 
the amount n in this decision context, for different life durations t. For instance, in one 
of the questions the subject had to choose n such that they would live 20 more years 
with q (0.5, 60% − 0.1 × 𝑛, 20𝑦; 60% + 0.4 × 𝑛, 20𝑦), with n measured in percentages, 
and b=0.4, c=-0.1; e.g. n=50% would correspond to (0.5, 55%, 20𝑦;  80%, 20𝑦). 
Repeating this for several durations t, we could test the correlation with the risk traits 





Participants were recruited randomly through a faculty internal recruitment system 
available to all undergraduate business students at the Rotterdam School of 
Management. As an incentive for taking part, participants were awarded with course 
credits. On arrival at the laboratory, a maximum of four students completed the 
procedure in the same room. A total of 124 students took part in the study. For two 
subjects, a program failure occurred during data collection. One student re-contacted us, 
asking to be excluded from the study because he had not answered faithfully. Therefore, 
a total of three cases were excluded from the study. The final sample size was N = 121 
(51.2% female). The average age of participants was 20.1 years (SD = 1.44). n = 19 
participants reported a physical health condition (16.0%), and n = 7 a mental health 
 




condition (5.8%), and the average self-reported quality of life on the visual analogue 
scale ranging from 0 (death) to 100 (best possible health) was 83.48 (SD = 9.57). The 
average BMI was 21.52 (SD = 2.26), and n = 13 participants were considered 
underweight (10.7%), while n = 9 were considered overweight (7.4%).  
 
3.2. Procedure  
Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the ethical review board of Erasmus 
University. Subjects were first asked to provide their informed consent and signed a 
form of solemn commitment. Signing such a solemn commitment has been shown to 
increase diligent responding (Jacquemet et al., 2018, 2019). Subsequently, subjects 
received instructions to complete a part eliciting their risk attitudes and treatment 
proneness and completed 5 practice questions (1 for risk aversion with respect to QoL, 
1 for correlation attitude, 1 for cross-prudence, 1 for cross-temperance, and 1 for 
treatment intensity). The order of the tasks was randomized. Within each trait, 
questions were not interspersed to avoid subjects having to switch between tasks 
continuously. Within each part, the questions were randomized. At the end of this part, 
4 questions were repeated in order to test consistency (1 for question on correlation 
attitude, 1 one cross-prudence for longevity, 1 on risk aversion for longevity and 1 for 
treatment intensity). The experiment was programmed in Matlab. A researcher was in 
the room with the participants during all sessions.  
 
3.3. Stimuli 
For all tasks, we took a QoL level of q=60% of full health to be the base QoL. For 
longevity, this base was t=40 life years. As a result, risk aversion for QoL was elicited by 
fixing longevity at 40 years while varying the variance of QoL. Likewise, risk aversion 
for longevity was assessed by fixing QoL at 60% while varying the variance of longevity 
between the options. A similar procedure was used for the other traits. Table 2 shows 
the stimuli for all traits. 
  
 









[(60% − 10%, 40𝑦); (60% − 40%, 40𝑦)] [(60%, 40𝑦); (60% − 50%, 40𝑦)] 
2 
[(60% − 10%, 40𝑦); (60% − 20%, 40𝑦)] [(60%, 40𝑦); (60% − 30%, 40𝑦)] 
3 





[(60%, 40𝑦 − 10𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦 − 20𝑦)] [(60%, 40𝑦 − 30𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦)] 
5 
[(60%, 40𝑦 − 10𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦 − 10𝑦)] [(60%, 40𝑦 − 20𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦)] 
6* 




[(60% − 40%, 40𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦 − 10𝑦)] [(60% − 40%, 40𝑦 − 10𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦)] 
8 
[(60% − 20%, 40𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦 − 20𝑦)] [(60% − 20%, 40𝑦 − 20𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦)] 
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[(60%, 40𝑦 − 20𝑦); (60% ± 20%, 40𝑦)] [(60% ± 20%, 40𝑦 − 20𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦)] 
11 
[(60%, 40𝑦 − 10𝑦); (60% ± 40%, 40𝑦)] [(60% ± 40%, 40𝑦 − 10𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦)] 
12 





[(60% − 20%, 40𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦 ± 20𝑦)] [(60% − 20%, 40𝑦 ±20𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦)] 
14* 
[(60% − 20%, 40𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦 ± 10𝑦)] [(60% − 20%, 40𝑦± 10𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦) 
15 




[(60% ± 20%, 40𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦 ± 20𝑦)] [(60% ± 20%, 40𝑦 ± 20𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦)] 
17 
[(60% ± 40%, 40𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦 ± 10𝑦)] [(60% ± 40%, 40𝑦 ± 10𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦)] 
18 
[(60% ± 20%, 40𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦 ± 10𝑦)] [(60% ± 20%, 40𝑦 ± 10𝑦); (60%, 40𝑦)] 
Note: a choice task was repeated once as a consistency check 
 
3.4. Treatment intensity 
Treatment proneness was operationalized as the preferred treatment intensity. Here, 
participants were presented with a singular 50-50 lottery, in which each outcome 
represented a quality of life index q for a given duration of life t. At baseline (intensity of 
0%, i.e. no treatment taken), the two lotteries were identical. The life duration was 
always exogenous; that is, the subject could not influence the life duration. The life 
duration was equal for both lottery outcomes, and it was either certain or associated 
with uncertainty. The former case represents the situation in which the comorbidity 
caused a known reduction in life duration, whilst in the second case the comorbidity 
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caused a riskier life duration. The subject could, however, influence the expected quality 
of life by choosing a preferred treatment intensity n, represented as a percentage 
ranging from 0 to 100, which subjects could choose from in steps of 2%. The treatment 
is associated with either benefits b (associated with one lottery outcome) or costs c 
(associated with the other lottery outcome). The size of the benefits and costs depends 
on the treatment intensity n. The higher the treatment intensity, the higher the potential 
benefits as well as the potential costs. We picked a ratio of b/c=4, and used three 
questions with a fixed duration (20, 30 and 40 years), and one question with a random 
duration of either t=10 or t=30 years, equally likely. An overview of the stimuli is 
provided in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3. Stimuli for the treatment intensity task 

















(50% 𝑜𝑟 100%, 20𝑦± 10𝑦) (50% 𝑜𝑟 100%, 20𝑦) (50% 𝑜𝑟 100%, 30𝑦) (50% 𝑜𝑟 100% , 40𝑦) (50% 𝑜𝑟 100% , 40𝑦 ±10𝑦)] 
 
*repeated at the end 
 
3.5. Analysis 
Data analysis was performed in R (R Core Team, 2016). We used the amount of choices 
(out of 3) that are compatible with a given risk trait as our measurement of the strength 
of multi- and univariate risk preferences. In our analysis, a subject is classified 
according to a risk trait if the majority of her choices is consistent with that particular 
trait. Thus, for example, an individual is classified as being risk averse (seeking) if most 
of her choices are compatible with risk aversion (seeking). For each of these traits, we 
investigated whether people show a given risk preference or behave at random based 
on a chi-square test. At the aggregate level, we report the average percentage of choices 
over tasks compatible with each trait. We use Fisher exact tests to compare the 
classifications obtained for each trait. To assess the relation between the higher-order 
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risk preferences and treatment intensity, we used repeated-measure ANOVAs and 
Friedman tests. We also used Wilcoxon and Student t-tests for complementary analysis. 
 Bleichrodt et al. (2003a) show under which conditions of the higher-order 
derivations, treatment intensity varies with duration. They show that an increase 
(decrease) in treatment intensity with duration is predicted by a decrease (increase) in 
risk aversion to health status with duration. In addition, when treatment intensity 
increases (decreases) with duration the sign of the following ratio is positive (negative):  
 
  𝑟 = 𝑈𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑈𝑞−𝑈𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑞𝑡𝑈𝑞2 . (2) 
 
Bleichrodt et al. (2003a) show that r corresponds to the responsiveness of (normalized) 
correlation aversion to changes in health status. Because the denominator of the 
fraction in Eq. 2 is always positive, its sign depends on the sign of the numerator, which 
gives an unambiguous sign only if particular combinations of higher-order risk traits 
are satisfied. For example, if a participant is cross-prudent for longevity, risk averse for 
QoL and correlation seeking we know that the fraction is positive, whilst it is negative 
for a participant who is risk averse for QoL, cross-imprudent for longevity and 
correlation averse. Instead, in case of cross-prudence for longevity, risk aversion and 
correlation aversion, we cannot make a prediction for the sign of the fraction without 
knowing the degrees of the higher-order derivatives (the degrees of correlation 
aversion, cross-prudence and risk aversion for quality of life). We test if our data 
generate an unambiguous sign by computing Eq. 2 using the signs of the median traits, 




4.1. Consistency checks 
To assess whether participants were consistent in their answers, four items were 
included twice in the experiment, measuring risk aversion for duration, correlation 
aversion, cross-prudence for QoL, and treatment intensity.  
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 For binary choices, subjects made the same choice in 75.38 percent of the repeated 
choices. This rate is consistent with the usually observed consistency rates in 
experiments (Stott, 2006, Attema et al, 2019). We also found some variability in 
consistency between the different tasks.3 For the treatment intensity choices, subjects 
made the same choice in 41.32 percent of the repeated choices. This percentage can be 
considered relatively low. Allowing for an error margin of 5 percentage points, the 
consistency rate increases to 53.72 percent. For an error margin of 10 percentage 
points, it raises to 67.77 percent. 
 
4.2. Risk preferences 
Table 4 shows the results on risk preferences. The first two columns show the aggregate 
results: the mean proportion of the three choices compatible with each trait and the 
associated standard deviation. The last two columns show the individual results. The 
third column corresponds to the classification of individuals, based on their risk 
preferences, and the fourth shows the p-value of a one-sided binomial test for 
comparison between the percentage of individuals and 50 percent. At the aggregate 
level, we performed a series of chi-squared tests to check whether the observed 
distribution of preferences deviated from the distribution that would be observed if 
subjects choose randomly. All tests show that choices were not made at random. 








deviation proportion p-value 
Risk aversion, quality of life 66.39 9.10 67.77 <0.01 
Risk aversion, longevity 74.38 5.03 79.34 <0.01 
Correlation aversion 10.19 2.66 4.13 <0.01 
Cross-prudence for quality of 
life 
36.64 3.73 32.23 <0.01 
Cross-prudence for longevity 27.27 7.06 23.14 <0.01 
 
3 For the tasks measuring risk aversion the consistency rate was equal to 76.03 percent, for correlation 




Cross-temperance 39.94 5.63 33.06 <0.01 
We found risk aversion to be the predominant pattern for both longevity and quality of 
life, with a large majority of the choices compatible with risk aversion in both cases. 
Figure 1 illustrates this point and shows the distribution of the number of risk averse 
choices for quality of life and for longevity. Figure 1 also shows the expected number of 
risk averse choices if participants chose at random. 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of the number of risk averse choices for quality of life and for 
longevity 
 
Overall, 58.68 percent of individuals were classified as both risk averse for longevity 
and for quality of life. The association between risk attitudes for longevity and quality of 
life was highly significant (Fisher test, p-value 0.007). 
 We found a clear choice pattern indicative of a preference for correlation seeking for 
longevity and quality of life with more than 90 percent of the choices compatible with 
correlation seeking. Figure 2 shows the distribution of correlation averse choices for 
quality of life and for longevity together with the distribution of risk averse individuals 
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for quality of life (panel (a)) and for longevity (panel (b)). Under expected utility, this 
pattern of preference suggests that the cross-derivative of the utility function 𝑈𝑞𝑡 is 
positive for most individuals. Using classifications at the individual level, we found no 
evidence for an association between correlation attitudes and risk attitudes for neither 
quality of life nor longevity. Due to the large majority of individuals being classified as 
correlation seeking (95.87 percent), this result is hardly surprising. 
 
Figure 2: Correlation aversion and risk aversion for QoL and longevity, distribution of the 
number of correlation averse choices 
 
 Table 4 also shows the classification of individuals depending on their cross-prudent 
choices. A majority of individuals were classified as cross-imprudent for quality of life 
(67.77 percent of individuals) and for longevity (76.86 percent of individuals). At the 
individual level, 9.09 percent of individuals were classified as cross-prudent in both 
attributes and 53.72 percent as cross-imprudent for both attributes. We found no 
significant association between those risk preferences, and risk and correlation 
aversion. Under expected utility, the pattern of preferences revealed in Table 4 suggests 
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that the cross-derivatives of the utility function 𝑈𝑞𝑡𝑡 and 𝑈𝑞𝑞𝑡 were negative for most 
individuals. 
 Last, we found evidence for cross-intemperance with a majority of subjects choosing 
compatible with this trait. We found an association between cross-temperance and 
cross-prudence for quality of life (Fisher test, p-value 0.014) but not for longevity 
(Fisher test, p-value 0.82). The combination of correlation seeking, cross-imprudence 
and cross-intemperance corresponded to the modal multivariate risk preference when 
both cross-prudence for quality of life and longevity were considered (for 48.76 percent 
and 52.07 percent of subjects, respectively). 
 
4.3. Choice of treatment intensity with certain longevity 
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics on the choice of treatment intensity. On average, 
subjects chose a treatment intensity of 60%. The values for the third quartile show that 
a significant number of individuals chose the maximum treatment intensity in any 
treatment. 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics on the choice of treatment intensity. 
 
Certain longevity Risky longevity 
 
T=20 T=30 T=40 T=20+10/-10 T=40+10/-10 
median 74.00 61.00 60.00 60.00 58.00 
Q1 36.00 39.00 32.00 30.00 38.00 
Q3 99.50 99.50 99.50 99.50 99.50 
mean 64.41 63.12 62.14 58.32 59.74 
sd 35.42 32.07 34.46 36.13 33.64 
 
 The median values reported in the first three columns of Table 5 suggest that 
treatment intensity decreases with longevity, while the means suggest a flat pattern 
instead. In order to test the association between treatment intensity and longevity, we 
ran a repeated-measure ANOVA with longevity as the within-subject factor. In 
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accordance with the mean values from Table 5, the results show that treatment 
intensity does not differ between the three tasks (p-value 0.72). A Friedman test shows 
however a marginally significant difference between the median values (p-value 0.08). 
Pairwise comparisons based on Wilcoxon or Student t-test support the results from the 
ANOVA. 
 Table 6 shows a classification of individuals based on the relation between longevity 
and treatment intensity. We used two rules to classify subjects. The strict rule classifies 
individuals as having a constant (increasing, decreasing) profile if they reported the 
same exact (increasing, decreasing) treatment intensity for the three longevities 𝑇 =20,30,40. We also used a more lenient rule allowing for a deviation of 5 percentage 
points in first-order differences. Subjects who were classified as neither constant nor 
increasing or decreasing were classified as exhibiting a non-monotone profile. 
Individual analysis from Table 6 shows that between 1/4 and 1/3 of the subjects chose 
constant treatment intensities for different longevities, a majority of them choosing 
extreme (0 and 100 percent) treatment intensities. For around 1/4 of the subjects, 
treatment intensity decreases with longevity and for around 1/6 of the subjects, 
treatment intensity increases with longevity. 
 
Table 6. Classification of individuals depending on the relationship between treatment 
intensity and longevity. 
 
Strict rule With 5 pp. error 
Constant 32 40 
Constant with extreme choices 27 27 
Decreasing 32 33 
Increasing 21 23 
Non-monotone 36 25 
 
 We now use the classification of individuals based on their choice apportionment in 
binary choice to evaluate the prediction of the expected utility model. More specifically, 
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we use the individual classification of risk aversion for quality of life, correlation 
aversion and cross-prudence for longevity to infer the sign of r defined in Eq (2). 
Remember that r measures the responsiveness of (normalized) correlation aversion to 
change in health status and is the key behavioral parameter governing the response of 
treatment intensity to duration.  
 For 60.33 percent of the individuals, the information gathered from binary choices 
did not allow to have a clear prediction on the sign of 𝑟. 25.62 percent were classified as 
revealing a negative 𝑟. The remaining 14.05 percent were classified as revealing a 
positive 𝑟. Because the test of expected utility is based on the sign of 𝑟, the risk 
apportionment technique does not allow to make firm predictions for a majority of 
subjects in our experiment. Figure 3 shows the distribution of treatment intensities at 
different longevities, based on the revealed sign of 𝑟. A visual inspection of Figure 3 
shows that treatment intensities tend to decrease for participants revealing a positive 𝑟 
and a non-monotone pattern for those revealing a negative 𝑟. An ANOVA with repeated-
measures for subjects with a revealed negative 𝑟 cannot reject constancy of treatment 
intensity (p-value 0.45). The same applies for the mixed case but also for positive 𝑟. In 
accordance with Figure 3, for the two latter classifications, a Friedman test nevertheless 




Figure 3: Relations between treatment intensity and the sign of responsiveness of 
normalized correlation attitude to changes in health status r. 
 
4.4. Choice of treatment intensity with risky longevity 
The values reported in Table 5 suggest that treatment intensity decreases when a risk 
on longevity is introduced. In order to test for the impact of risky longevity on treatment 
intensity, we run a repeated-measure ANOVA, with two within-subject factors (certain 
vs. risky longevity and expected longevity equal to either 𝑇 = 20 or 𝑇 = 40). The results 
from the ANOVA show that treatment intensity did not vary with longevity (p-value 
0.89) and that riskiness of longevity has only a marginal impact on treatment intensity 
(p-value 0.06). Pairwise comparisons based on Wilcoxon or Student t-tests support the 
results from the ANOVA: the differences between treatment intensities at certain and 
risky longevity were not significantly different at expected longevity equal to 𝑇 = 40 
years, but were marginally different at expected longevity equal to 𝑇 = 20 years 
(Wilcoxon two-sided test, p-value 0.07, Student two-sided t-test, p-value 0.07). One-
sided interpretations of pairwise comparisons therefore show evidence for decreasing 
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treatment intensity with riskiness of longevity, at least when expected longevity is low. 
Last, the base value of treatment intensity (t=20 or t=40) did not impact treatment 
intensity when duration was risky4 (Wilcoxon two-sided test, p-value 0.49, Student two-
sided t-test, p-value 0.61). 
 Bleichrodt et al. (2003a) show that risk aversion alone is not sufficient to predict the 
reaction of the introduction of a risky longevity in the choice of treatment intensity. In 
particular, they show that it is far from obvious that the riskiness of longevity leads, 
through risk aversion, to a decrease in treatment intensity. We tested this hypothesis by 
comparing the differences between risky and certain longevity (for expected longevity 
equal to either t=20 or t=40) for risk averse and risk seeking subjects. Results are 
shown in Figure 4, which makes it clear that risk aversion, per se, is not clearly 
associated with a systematic drop in treatment intensity when longevity is risky5. Figure 
4 also shows that risk seeking does not translate in a systematic increase in treatment 
intensity when risky longevity is introduced. A repeated-measure ANOVA, with one 
within-subject factor (expected longevity equal to either t=20 or t=40) and one 
between-subject factor (risk attitudes), shows that the former has no significant effect 
on the difference between treatment intensity for risky or certain longevity (p=0.156). 
Together, these results confirm Bleichrodt et al. (2003a) that there is not a one-to-one 
link between risk aversion for longevity and choice of treatment intensity when 
longevity becomes risky. 
 
 
4 At the individual level, we used a classification similar to the one shown in Table 3. We classified 
participants based on the relation between riskiness of longevity and treatment intensity using a strict 
rule and a more lenient rule with 5 percentage points tolerance on first-order differences. Results show 
that between 1/4 and 1/3 of the subjects chose constant treatment intensity at different longevities. For 
around 1/4 of the subjects, the treatment intensity increases with risky longevity and for around 1/6 of 
the subjects, treatment intensity decreases with risky longevity. 
5 In Figure 4, the variation in treatment intensity corresponds to the difference in treatment intensity 
between risky and certain longevity. A negative value indicates that the chosen treatment intensity was 




Figure 4: Relations between variation in treatment intensity and risk attitudes 
 
5. Discussion 
The study set out with two objectives. First, we aimed to describe people’s multivariate 
and higher-order risk attitudes for longevity and quality of life. Second, we conducted a test of the QALY model by assessing how people’s higher-order risk attitudes were 
related to their preference for treatment intensity.   
 Our findings for the risk apportionment task confirm the intuitive predictions of 
Bleichrodt et al. (2003a) that people are risk averse and correlation seeking for 
duration and quality of life. Concerning risk aversion, this is a reassuring finding, in 
accordance with previous evidence (Attema et al., 2013, 2016, Delprat et al., 2016). The 
finding of correlation seeking on the other hand is particularly interesting given the 
widespread evidence of correlation aversion for other outcomes (Ebert and van de 
Kuilen, 2015), although it has been found for the QALY model before (McNeil et al., 
1981; Pliskin et al., 1980; Sutherland et al., 1982). Under expected utility, correlation 
seeking reveals that increasing longevity reinforces the marginal utility of variations 
(positive or negative) in quality of life insofar as individuals benefit from it or 
experience it longer. This study’s results also indicate a clear majority of cross-
imprudent choices, albeit less deviant from neutrality than for the second-order traits. 
Lastly, the evidence is, as usual, least pronounced for intemperance, but still we found a 
significant deviation from 50%. The model of Bleichrodt et al. (2003a) neither provides 
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any predictions for the signs of these higher-order preferences, nor does it give intuitive 
predictions. Hence, our study provides the first evidence of these higher-order, 
multivariate, risk preferences. These findings can have large implications for several 
health-related behaviors and open up a new research area. 
 We found no correlation between longevity and treatment intensity (i.e. health status 
risks). This result is in contrast with the prediction of Bleichrodt et al. (2003a), who 
argued that it would be plausible for health status risks to decrease with life expectancy. 
The absence of such a relation suggests that (this part of) the QALY model is valid, 
because it implies comorbidities that only affect life duration indeed have no impact on 
treatment decisions that only affect quality of life. However, we admit that there are 
several caveats to this conclusion. First, the treatment intensity task may not have been 
the best way to elicit treatment preferences, which could explain the high amount of 
noise and the multimodal preferences observed in this task. Second, since the 
theoretical analysis by Bleichrodt et al. (2003a) assumes expected utility, our test of the 
QALY model based on their framework is only valid to the extent that expected utility 
holds. Otherwise, it may be the case that the observed findings are due to a falsification 
of expected utility, and that the QALY model would not be valid in a non-EU framework. 
It is left to future research to test these properties of the QALY model without the 
restriction to EU. Still, our results regarding the sign of Eq. 2 do not contradict the lack 
of a correlation between treatment intensity and duration and duration risk, lending 
some credibility to the test. 
 We report a differential impact of the introduction of a background risk on longevity 
for different amounts of longevity. For high expected longevity, the background risk did 
not impact the choice of treatment intensity while it significantly decreased it for lower 
expected longevity. According to this result, the QALY model, which imposes a neutral 
impact of the background risk on treatment decisions, appears to be more robust for 
long durations than for short durations. This result confirms the empirical results from 
Bleichrodt et al. (2003b) and Attema and Brouwer (2008), who showed in a very 
different experimental setting that standard elicitations of the QALY model (standard 




 The use of risk apportionment techniques to identify higher-order risk attitudes, and 
therefore infer the properties of the utility function has its own limitations. Under 
expected utility, risk apportionment techniques allow to obtain clear measurements of 
the signs of successive derivatives of the utility function from behavioral traits. The 
method is easy to handle for experimenters and the elements of choices are rather easy 
to understand for participants to an experiment. However, risk apportionment 
techniques perform poorly if one needs to obtain precise knowledge on the shape of the 
utility function. Such knowledge is required if one wants a precise elicitation of the 
effect of a risky comorbidity on the optimal treatment decision. For such comparative 
statics results, elicitation of risk aversion and other higher-order risk preferences by 
risk apportionment techniques are too coarse to elicit all the determinants of marginal 
benefits and marginal costs of treatment. A precise empirical assessment of those 
comparative statics would require an elicitation of more complex objects such as 
prudence premia for longevity and health status.  
 Another limitation is that we used a student sample for our lab study. Although this 
sample is not representative of the general public, it was useful for a first test 
application of risk apportionment techniques to the QALY model. Nevertheless, a clear 
drawback of our young sample is that they are unlikely to have much experience with 
illness. Hence, our conclusions, even if firm (especially for correlation seeking), should 
be interpreted with caution and future research should test if our first results can be generalized to the general public’s preferences and, perhaps, patient preferences. 
 Third, given that we studied preferences for health, we could obviously not use real 
incentives. However, we are not aware of any way to implement real incentives for this 
type of preferences, so the use of hypothetical incentives seems to be the best currently 
available alternative. A large literature has been developed on willingness to pay for 
health gains and QALY gains (Ryen and Svensson, 2015) and could be used as a basis for 
attaching financial incentives to health gains and losses. The methods developed in that 
literature might not be suitable to implement financial incentives in an experimental 
setting for several reasons. First, the monetary amounts attached to QALY gains (and 
losses) are rather substantial and incompatible with experimental implementation. As 
an example, Bobinac et al. (2014) report willingness to pay for one QALY gains to range 
from 80,000 euros to 250,000 euros, depending on the underlying theoretical 
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assumptions. Second, most studies estimate willingness to pay under certainty, which 
creates an upward bias in the estimation (Olofsson et al., 2019). Last, most of the 
literature on willingness to pay for health gains and QALY gains is based on hypothetical 
tasks and incentives are mostly devoted to reward participation. 
 The QALY model has been largely challenged as a descriptive model for health 
decisions, mainly because of violations of expected utility (Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2005). 
One of the reasons why the QALY would fail to represent risk preferences is therefore 
largely due to biases and heuristics in elicitation methods, such as the certainty effect 
(Bleichrodt et al., 2007) or loss aversion (Bleichrodt et al., 2003b). In this paper we used 
a different methodology, based on risk apportionments, to assess the descriptive ability 
of the QALY model. One advantage of this methodology rests on its use of paired 
gambles, for which expected utility is less likely to be violated. Our results show that, at 
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Table 7 shows the percentages of choices compatible with risk apportionment for each 
binary choice task in the experiment. 










1 73 60.33  
2 75 61.98  




1 87 71.90 76.03 
2 86 71.07  
3 97 80.17  
Correlation 
aversion 
1 10 8.26 88.43 
2 11 9.09  





1 44 36.36 61.67 
2 40 33.06  




1 34 28.10  
2 24 19.83  
3 41 33.88  
Cross-
temperance 
1 56 46.28  
2 43 35.54  
3 46 38.02  
 
 
 
